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Law declared by the Supreme Court cannot be by-passed by the High Court on the ground that some point has not been considered. Ruling by the Supreme Court that order for payment of compensation can be enforced by imposing sentence in default. High Court holding that it need not be followed by Subordinate Courts of State as the ruling has been made without considering S.431 of Cr.P.C. was impermissible. [See Suganthi Suresh Kumar Vs. Jagdeeshan (AIR 2002 SC 681)]
Recording of finding by the High Court without considering the law laid down by Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was held to be not proper in P. Purushottam Reddy Vs. M/s. Pratap Steels Ltd., (AIR 2002 SC 771).
However, in The State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. Jagadamba Oil Mills (AIR 2002 SC 834), it was held that reliance on precedents blindly was not proper and the factual situation between decided case and case at hand are to be discussed.
It has been held in the case reported in Mahadeo Lal Vs. Administrator General, W.B. (AIR 1960 SC936) that not merely convention but rules framed by several High Courts require that there a Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with another single Judge or a Division Bench decision, he or it should have a reference made to a larger Bench or place the papers before the Chief Justice for such a reference being made.
A Supreme Court decision on a particular point binds the High Court. The High Court cannot ignore it on the ground that the relevant statutory provisions were not brought to the Supreme Court’s notice or a particular aspect was not considered [vide Ballabhdas Vs. Municipal Committee (AIR 1970 SC 1002)].
It is well settled that an interpretation in a Supreme Court decision or a decision by High Court’s larger bench is binding on a smaller bench of the same High Court and the latter cannot refuse to follow the larger bench on the ground that it had wrongly understood or considered a Supreme Court decisions [See State Industries Promotion Corporation Vs. Arputharaj (AIR 1991 MAD. 116 (DB)]
Where the Supreme Court decisions which are the laws of the land under Article 141, were not noticed in an earlier decision of the high Court, the later bench is entitled to follow the law as laid down in the Supreme court decision in Deepak Vs. State of Bihar (AIR 1982 PAT. 126).
In I.F.C.I. Ltd., Vs. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., (AIR 2002 SC 1841), the plea that the decision in question being not a detailed judgment, does not have binding effect was rejected.
Judicial discipline requires in matter on which Supreme Court had already expressed its views and which the Supreme Court is seized of. High Court should not issue any direction in that regard but should leave the matter to the Supreme court. [vide B. Ramnjini Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 2002 SC 2023)]
In Delhi Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar Behal (AIR 2002 SC 2940), there was difference of opinion between co-equal benches of High Court regarding fixation of price of MIG flats in the same Housing Scheme. Since there was a divergence of opinion, the matter was referred to Full Bench to resolve the conflict. Conflict was resolved by full bench by holding that revision of price by the Authority was neither arbitrary nor illegal. Special leave petition filed against it had already been dismissed by the Supreme Court. It was held that the decision of the Full Bench, would be binding and the decision by the Division Bench taking a view opposite to the Full Bench was liable to be set aside.
For a declaration of law there should be speech i.e. speaking order. Appeal was made before Supreme Court against Division Bench decision of High Court in M. Varadaraja Pillai’s case [1972 (85) Mad. LW 760)]. Dismissal simpliciter on technical ground by Supreme Court was without adjudication on merits. Reasoning or law contained in the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court does not stand merged in order of Supreme Court dismissing appeal in such sense as to amount to declaration of law. Full Bench of the High Court is not precluded from going into vires of the State Legislation involved [S. Shanmugavel Nadar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 2002 SC 3484)].
A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. A judgment should be understood in the light of facts of that case and no more should be read into it that what it actually says. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of Supreme Court divorced from the context of the question under consideration and threat it to be complete law decided by Supreme Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before Supreme Court [vide Mehboob Dawood Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra (2004 AIR SCW 527)].
Presumptions of fact or law recognised by successive judicial pronouncements over years have to be valued as precedents. [LIC of India Vs. Anuradha (2004 AIR SCW 2017)].
Generally, in order to follow rule of law, judicial discipline, held, requires the Court to follow precedents biding on it. [Govt. of W.B. Vs. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347]
Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by the Supreme Court cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or Court, be it even the highest court in a State, oblivious to Article 141 of the Constitution. [State of Punjab Vs. Bhag Singh (2004) 1 SCC 547]
CONFLICTING VIEWS/CONTRARY DECISIONS
It has been held by Karnataka High Court in Rudrayya Vs. Gangawwa (AIR 1976 Kar. 153) that even in cases where a High Court finds conflict between the views of the larger and smaller Supreme Court Benches, it may not disregard the views of the larger Bench. The proper course for the High Court would be to try to find out and follow the opinion of the larger Benches in preference to the opinion of the smaller Benches.
A Full Bench of Karnataka High Court in the case reported in Govinda Naik Vs. West Patent Press [AIR 1980 KAR. 92 (FB)] has held if there is inconsistency between two Supreme Court decisions one by a Bench of three Judges and the other of four Judges, the latter has to be followed.
It has been further held that in case of conflict between two Supreme Court decisions by the Benches of equal strength, the later decision would be binding on the High Court, it having impliedly overruled the earlier decision. Merely because the earlier decision was not brought to the Court’s notice, the latter decision is not rendered in-curiam. [See Yaragatti Vs. Vasant (1987) 2 KAR.L.J. 9 (FB)]
In Mattu Lal Vs. Radha Lal (AIR 1974 SC 1596) it has been held that decision of a larger Bench has to be preferred thought it was earlier. When two directly conflicting Supreme Court Judgments of equal authority exist, the High Court must follow the judgment appearing to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. Whether one of the judgments is earlier or later in time or whether the later judgment failed to consider the earlier judgment is hardly relevant, and, in any case, not conclusive.
In D.V. Lakshmana Rao Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2001(4) KAR.L.J. 185 our Hon’ble High Court has held thus:
“It is now well-settled that if there are two conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court, of Benches with equal number of Judges, then the latter will prevail over the earlier. But where the earlier judgment is of a larger Bench and the latter judgment is of a smaller Bench, then the decision of the larger Bench will be binding..... When there is divergence between decisions of two co-ordinate Benches of the Supreme Court, the latter decision should prevail. The exception arises where the first decision specifically considers a particular question and lays down the principles relating to the question and the subsequent decision, without noticing the earlier decision or the principles laid down therein, and without examining the question, renders an assumptive decision. In such a situation, the earlier decision which considered the question and lays down the principle will apply”.
In Nutan Kumar Vs. 2nd Addl. Dist. Judge (AIR 2002 SC 3456)—Full Bench of High Court cannot say that authority is perhaps in conflict with other decision without looking into whether there really is any conflict of decisions of binding authority of Supreme Court. In absence of any conflict, judicial discipline and propriety required that majority of Full Bench followed the binding authority of the Supreme Court.
IS THE SUPREME COURT BOUND BY ITS OWN DECISIONS
It has been held in The Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. The Commissioner of I.T. (AIR 1965 SC 1636), that the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions. The Court will surely be slow to do so unless such a previous decision appears to be obviously erroneous. Words “All Courts” under Article 141 do not include the Supreme Court and therefore the Supreme Court is itself not bound by its decisions and is free to depart from a previous decision if the Court is satisfied of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public.
In reviewing its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court however would be particularly slow to disturb a unanimous decision of a bench of 5 judges, in particular, where the previous decision of the Constitution Bench, the later court should treat it as final unless the subject is of such fundamental importance to national life. A contrary decision of a larger bench prevails over the decision of a smaller bench where a question has been decided by a Larger Bench, all subsequent decisions by a smaller Bench.It has been held in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija Vs. Collector, Thane (AIR 1990 SC 261), that the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The Division Bench of two judges cannot overturn the decision of another Bench of two judges. If they are unable to agree, they should refer it to a larger Bench.
The doctrine of precedents does not apply to an order rejecting a Special Leave Petition. Where however the Supreme Court dismisses Special Leave Petition with reasons, this reason would attract Article 141 and be binding on all Courts in India. But a dismissal of a Writ Petition in limini without giving reasons therefor, would not operate as resjudicata, and such a decision does not amount to a declaration of the law within the meaning of Article 141, and it cannot bind a subordinate court. This was the view taken by Karantaka High Court in Govindnaik g. Kalaghatgi Vs. West Patent Press (AIR 1980 Kant. 130).
In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Vs. Mumbai Shramik Sangh (2001 AIR SCW 1846) it was held that the decision of Constitution Bench binds bench of two Judges of Supreme Court and judicial discipline obliges them to follow it. Division Bench in case having doubt about its correctness could have placed matter before Bench of three Judges instead of referring matter to Constitution Bench. The matter was directed to be heard by Bench of two Judges.
Precedents of Supreme Court are binding on itself. Where conflicting decisions were given by coordinate Benches of the Supreme Court, the earlier decision rendered by three Judges Bench unanimously and the later decision rendered only by a majority of 2:1, the later decision having not noticed the earlier binding precedent of a coordinate Bench, was held to be rendered per incuriam. In [Babu Parasu Kaikadi Vs. Babu (2004) 1 SCC 681], it was held that the Supreme Court is bound to follow the earlier judgment which is precisely on the point in preference to the later judgment which was rendered without adequate argument at the Bar and also without reference to the mandatory provisions of the enactment/precedents.
It is held in Collector of Central Excise Vs. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd., [(2004) 1 SCC 597] that a smaller Bench (comprising three Judges) is bound by the decision of Constitution Bench.
THE VALUE OF OBITER DICTA
Obiter Dicta is an observation by a Court on a legal question suggested by a case before it, but not arising in such manner as to require decision. It is not binding as a precedent, because the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced by the Court.
In the course of judgment a Judge, may let fall various observations not precisely relevant to the issue before him. He may for instance illustrate his general reasoning by reference to hypothetical situations and the law which he considers to apply to them. These observations by the way are called Obiter Dicta, and they are without binding authority. Nevertheless they are important because they not only help to rationalize the law but they serve to suggest solutions to problems not yet decided by the Courts. According to Salmond, the Dicta of House of Lords or of Judges who were masters of their fields, like Lord Blackburn, may often in practice enjoy greater prestige than the rationes of lesser judges.
OBITER DICTA OF SUPREME COURT
In the case reported in Commissioner of I.T., Hyderabad Vs. Nazir Sultan (AIR 1959 SC 814), it has been held that though not binding as a precedent, an obiter of the Supreme Court, being the highest tribunal, is worthy of respect and considerable weight. That has been reiterated in D.G. Viswanath Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Mysore (AIR 1964 MYS. 132) that the Obiter Dicta by Supreme Court is binding on all subordinate Courts. The Supreme Court has observed in the case reported in Municipal Committee, Amritsar Vs. Hazara Singh (AIR 1975 SC 1087) that though the Supreme Court obiter dicta should be accepted as binding, but every statement made in a Supreme Court Judgment does not attract Article 141. The statements on matters other than those of law, have no binding force. Thus, decisions essentially on questions of fact, are no precedents for decision of other cases.
It has been held in a case reported in Narbada Prasad Vs. Awadesh Narain (AIR 1973 MP 179) that though the obiter dicta of the Supreme Court is binding and must be followed, the said rule does not apply to High Court decisions. When there is a conflict between the ratio decidendi of two Division Benches both being binding precedents, a single Judge must refer the question for decision by a larger Bench but if the conflict is between the ratio decidendi of one Division Bench and the other obiter dicta of another, the latter is not a binding precedent, and a single Judge is free to follow the former and need not make a reference to a larger Bench. However, decision of Supreme Court not declaring any law or principle but only giving certain directions to dispose of the matter in special circumstances of the case, cannot be mechanically adopted by the High Courts as a general formula. Courts have to find out ratio of the decision and ascertain the law declared from a careful reading of the decision before applying it to other cases [Delhi Admn.I Vs. Manoharlal (AIR 2002 SC 3088)].
Former Chairperson, Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission
Former Chief Justice of Madras & Karnataka High Court.
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