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Therefore, what is important when considering a Supreme Court decision which is binding under the Constitution as the law of the land is the Ratio-Decidendi thereof and whether that is applicable to the facts of the particular case. If the ratio applies, then it will not be right for any court to draw fine distinctions between the case in hand and the facts of the Supreme Court case. The Supreme Court itself has made it clear in a number of decisions as to what exactly binds the lower Courts. It is not everything said by the Supreme Court in its judgment; what is binding to all is the ratio of the decision to be gathered from the principles of law on the basis whereof the Supreme Court decides the case. A minority judgment of the Supreme Court is not a binding precedent, but it is of great persuasive value being a judgment of the highest Court.
It has been in C. Narayanaswamy Vs. State of Karnataka [AIR 1992 Knt. 28(DB)] that it is impermissible for a High Court to follow the opinion of an author whatever his eminence be, when a direct decision of Supreme Court on the disputed question is there. What is binding is the principle underlying a decision. While applying a decision in a later case, therefore, the later Court should try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the previous decision, in the context of the questions involved in that case from which the decision takes its colour. The later Court would be bound by those reasons or propositions which were not necessary for deciding the previous case.
However, as held in P.G.I. of M.E. and Research Vs. Raj Kumar (2001 AIR SCW 77), a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be precedent in subsequent case which is based on its own facts. [See also Gangadhar Vs. State of Orissa (AIR 2002 SC 3633)].
As held in Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 2003 SC 511) a decision, as is well known, is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deducted therefrom. It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedental value of a decision.
Counsel making an admission or a concession on a question of law which is wrong, cannot enure to the benefit of any party. Law laid down by the Court on the basis of a wrong concession or admission, does not constitute a binding precedent. [The Central Council for Research in Ayurveda and Siddha Vs. K. Santhakumari (2001 AIR SCW 2155)].
No doubt, the doctrine of binding precedent promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. In Chandra Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (AIR 2002 SC 1652), where a judgment was delivered by two Judge Bench in conflict with a judgment of three Judge Bench, it was held that the law laid down by two Judge Bench was not correct law and could not be followed. The matter was directed to be placed before Bench of three Judges for final disposal.
In I.F.C.I. Ltd., Vs. Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., (AIR 2002 SC 18410 the plea that it being not a detailed judgment does not have binding effect was rejected.
In Delhi Admn. Vs. Manoharlal (AIR 2002 SC 3088), it was held that where a decision of the Supreme Court had not declared any law or principle but had only given certain directions to dispose of the matter in special circumstances of the case, such order of the Supreme Court could not be mechanically adopted by the High Court as a general formula. Courts have to find out the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court and ascertain the law so declared from careful reading of the decision before applying it to other cases.
There is always peril in treating words of judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment. It is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. 13. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on decision is not proper. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. [See Gangadhar Behera Vs. State of Orissa (AIR 2002 SC 3633) and Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda (AIR 2004 SC 1625)].
Circumstantial flexibility, or additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions of two cases or between two accused in the same case. Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. It is more pronounced in criminal cases where the backbone of adjudication is fact based [vide Megh Singh Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 2003 SC 3184)].
So, as held in Ashwani Kumar Singh Vs. U.P. Public Service Commission (AIR 2003 SC 2661), reliance on a decision cannot be placed without discussing whether it was rendered in the same factual and legal background. Judgments of Court cannot be construed as statutes since judges interpret words of statutes.
In Supreet Batra Vs. Union of India (AIR 2003 SC 1084), the Apex Court observed that the schemes formulated by the Supreme Court should not be read as if they are statutes or that inexorable rights are conferred upon the parties.
Dismissal of SLP as threshold without a reasoned order, has no precedential value [Union of India Vs. Jaipal Singh (2004(1) SCC 121)].
A line or a word in a judgment cannot be read in isolation or as if interpreting a statutory provision, to impute a different meaning to the observation. [Prabha Shankar Dubey Vs. State of M.P. (2004 2 SCC 56].
A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. A judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Supreme Court. [Mehboob Dawood Singh Vs. State of Maharashtra (2004) 2 SCC 362]
EXCEPTIONS TO THE BINDING AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENTS
There are two exceptions to the binding authority of precedents and they are: a) the rule of Sub-silentio and b) being per incuriam.
A) SUB-SILENTIO A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense when the particular point of law involved in it was not perceived by the Court or present to its mind. The Court may consciously decide in favour of one party because of point A, which it considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically that the Court should not have decided in favour of the particular party unless its also decided point B in his favour; but point B was not argued or considered by the Court. In such circumstances, although point B was logically involved in the facts and although the case had a specific outcome, the decision is not an authority on point B. Point B is said to pass sub-silentio.
An illustration would make this exception clear. In Gerard Vs. Worth of Paris Ltd. (1936) 2 AII.E.R. 905, the case involved a discharged employee of a company applying for a garnished order or a bank account standing in the name of the liquidator of the company as the employee had obtained damages against the company for wrongful dismissal. The only point argued was on the question what a garnishee order could properly be made on an account of the standing in the name of the liquidator. When this very point was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal, the Court held itself not bound by its previous decision. It was held that the point now raised did not deliberately passed sub-silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. Thus we see that the rule that precedent sub-silentio is not authoritative has got a long history behind it. In M/s. A-One Granites Vs. State of U.P. (2001 AIR SCW 848), question arose regarding applicability of R. 72 in case of re-grant of a mining lease which had not been referred to nor considered by the Supreme Court in the earlier decision rendered in Premnath Sharma Vs. State of U.P. [AIR 1997 SC 2252]. Precedent sub-silentio was held to be not binding.
B) PER-INCURIAM
‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English Courts have developed its principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The Supreme Court has held, in the case reported in the State of U.P. Vs. Synthesis & Chemicals Ltd., (1994) 4 SCC 139 that the ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if it is rendered ‘in ingoratium of a statute or other binding authority’. A precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of statute i.e., delegated legislation. This rule was laid down for the House of Lords by Lord Halsbury in London Street Tramways Vs. London County Council (1898 AC 375). A judgment which has not failed to notice either statutory provision in substance and effect or binding precedent cannot be said to be per incuriam. [M/s. Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. Vs. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2001 AIR SCW 2087)]
As laid down in State of Bihar Vs. Kalika Kuer (AIR 2003 SC 2443), the earlier judgment may seem to be not correct. Yet it would be binding on a later Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Fact that possible aspect of matter was not considered or not raised before court or more aspects of matter should have been gone into by court deciding the matter earlier. That would not be a reason to hold that the decision was rendered per incuriam.
BASICS OF BINDING NATURE OF DECISIONS
Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice. It is consistency which creates confidence in the system and this consistency can never be achieved without respect to the rule of finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial pronouncements, the Courts have evolved the rule of precedents, principle of stare decisis etc. These rules and principles are based on public policy and if these are not followed by Courts then there will be chaos in the administration of justice [See Govt. of Andhra Pradesh Vs. A.P. Jaiswal (2001 AIR SCW 101)].
It has been held by the Supreme Court in B. Sharma Rao Vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry (AIR 1967 SC 1480) that a decision is binding not because of its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein. The binding character of judicial decision may flow either from a constitutional or statutory provision or form the conventions which the Courts observe in the administration of justice.
Judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. But if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is, to refer the matter before it to a Bench of three learned Judges setting out the reasons why it could not agree with the earlier judgment and then if the Bench of three learned Judges also comes to the conclusion that the earlier judgment of a Bench of three learned Judges is incorrect, than a reference could be made to a Bench of five learned Judges. [See Union of India Vs. Hansoli Devi (AIR 2002 SC 3240)].
In Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho Vs. Jagdish (2001 AIR SCW 223), it was held that a Judge sitting singly who is of opinion that the previous decision of another single Judge on a question of law is wrong, must refer matter to larger Bench because quality of certainty is necessary in law.
There is no precedent on facts. It is legal proposition flowing from judgment which has the binding effect [See Ram Prasad Subba Vs. Mani Kumar Subba (AIR 2003 SC 51)].
Cont..
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