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Directive Principles of State Policy
—JUSTICE NAGENDRA K. JAIN
Article 36 to 51 in Part IV of the Constitution of India contain the Directive Principles of State Policy. The aim of these Directive Principles is establishment of a “Welfare State” which is envisaged in the preamble to the Constitution. If the U.N. Convention of Right to Development is an inalienable Human Right, the Directive Principles which also aim at development of the State, thereby stand elevated to the level of Human Rights. The Supreme Court in Unnikrishnan’s case (AIR 1993 SC 2178) went to the extent of observing that the Directive Principles constitute “Conscience of the Constitution”.
Briefly stated, by Article 38, the State is directed to strive to promote the welfare of the people. Article 39 directs the policy of the state to take into account the right of adequate means to livelihood, equal pay for equal work for both men and women, health and strength of the workers, ownership and control of material resources to be so distributed to serve the common goods. Article 39A refers to equal justice and free legal aid which the State is obliged to promote. Article 40 directs the State to take steps to recognize Village Panchayats and by Article 41 the State is directed to strive within the limits of its economic capacity for securing the right to work, right to education and public assistance in cases of employment, old age, sickness and disablement. Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief and provision for a living wage are the directives in Articles 42 and 43 respectively. Participation of workers in management of industries is referred to in Article 43A. Uniform Civil Code for citizens is a goal to be achieved by the State under Article 44. Provision for free and compulsory education for all children up to the age of 14 years is taken care of by Article 45 and 46 requires the State to promote educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections of the society. Importance with regard to standard of living and improvement of public health are the directives in Article 47 and Article 48 requires the State to organize its agriculture and animal husbandry. Environmental Protection and to safeguard the forest and wild life is what Article 48A provide for. Likewise, protection of monuments and places of objects of national importance are taken care of by Article 49. Separation of Judiciary from executive is the directive contained in Article 50 and finally promotion of international peace and security is envisaged in Article 51.
INTERPRETATION OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES
In the formative years of the working of our Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Directive Principles were looked upon as merely directions to the State and it was held that the Directive Principles did not confer any enforceable rights and their alleged breach does not invalidate a law nor does it entitle a citizen to complain of its violation by the State. However, this negative aspect with which the Directive Principles were looked upon began to receive a positive aspect through later decisions of the Supreme Court and we have now reached a state wherein the Directive Principles are looked upon as equivalent to Human Rights and the directives have been held to supplement fundamental rights in achieving a welfare state. The power of the Parliament to amend fundamental rights in order to implement the Directive Principles have also been recognized by the Courts as long as the amendment does not touch the basic structure of the Constitution.
Having thus seen the importance of Directive Principles of State Policy in achieving the aims and objects of the State, it now becomes necessary to know the differences between the Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Rights.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICYAND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Interpretation of Part III and Part IV of the Constitution by the Supreme Court in number of cases has now crystallised the differences that exist between the Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Rights. The differences between the two are as follows:
(i) The Directives (in short for Directive Principles of State Policy) are not enforceable in the Courts and they do not create any justiciable rights in favour of individuals.
(ii) The Directives require to be implemented by Legislation, but, at the same time no existing Law or Legal Right can be violated under the colour of following a Directive.
(iii) The Courts can declare any law as void on the ground that it contravenes any of the Fundamental Rights.
(iv) The Courts are not competent to compel the Government to carry out any Directive or to make any law for that purpose.
(v) The Directives per se do not confer upon or take away any Legislative Power from the appropriate Legislature.
(vi) Although it is the duty of the State to implement the Directives, yet the State can do so only subject to the limitation imposed by the Constitution itself i.e., Article 13(2) prohibits the State from making any law which takes away or abridges the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III and the Directive Principles therefore cannot override this categorical limitation.
When one goes through the above differences between the Directive Principles in relation to the Fundamental Rights, one tends to draw the inference that the Directive Principles are rather inferior to the Fundamental Rights. But, there was a shift in the Judicial pronouncements in regard to the interpretation of the Directive Principles of State Policy and ever since Keshavananda Bharathi’s case, the Directive Principles began to receive more and more importance. It therefore becomes necessary to trace these developments in judicial pronouncements starting from Keshavanand Bharathi’s case in order to fully appreciate the importance of the Directive Principles of State Policy and therefore I now proceed to refer to leading Judgments of the Apex Court of our country.
KESHAVANANDA BHARATHI vs. STATE OF KERALA (AIR 1973 SC 1461)
The relationship between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles has been very well explained in this land mark judgment by the Apex Court thus:
“If any distinction between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles on the basis of a difference between ends or means were really to be attempted, it would be more proper, in my opinion to view Fundamental Rights as the ends of the endeavours of the Indian people for which the Directive Principles provided the guidelines”.
“Perhaps, the best way of describing the relationship between the Fundamental Rights of individual citizens, which imposed corresponding obligations upon the State and the Directive Principles would be to look upon the Directive Principles as laying down the path of the Country’s progress towards the allied objectives and aims stated in the Preamble, with Fundamental Rights as the limits of that path, like the banks of a flowing river, which could be mended or amended by displacements, replacements or curtailments or enlargements of any part according to the path. In other words, the requirements of the path itself were more important”.
MINERVA MILLS LTD. vs. UNION OF INDIA (AIR 1980 SC 1789)
Speaking for the Court, Justice Bhagawati (as he then was) observed:
“The Indian Constitution is founded on the bed-rock of the balance between Parts III & IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. The goals set out in Part IV have to be achieved without the abrogation of the means provided for by Part III. It is in this sense that Parts III & IV together constitute the core of our Constitution and combine to form its conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will ipso facto destroy an essential element of the basis structure of our Constitution".
LINGAPPA POCHANNA vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (AIR 1985 SC 389)
While dealing with Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, the Court held that the said Act is an illustration of distributive Justice and observed that the Courts should as far as possible uphold the Legislation enacted by the State to ensure “distributive Justice” i.e., laws which seek to remove inequalities and also attempt to achieve a fair division of wealth amongst members of the society.
GRIH KALYAN KENDRA WORKERS UNION vs. UNION OF INDIA (AIR 1991 SC 1773)
In this case the Apex Court while dealing with Article 39(d) (Equal pay for equal work) held thus:
“Equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by the Constitution as a Fundamental Right but in view of the Directive Principles of State Policy as contained in Art. 39(d) of the Constitution “equal pay for equal work” has assumed the status of the Fundamental Right in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality in Articles 14 and 17 of the Constitution”.
STATE BANK OF INDIA vs. M.R. GANESH BABU (AIR 2002 SC 1955) (A) ARTS. 39(D), 16
For applicability of the rule equal pay for equal work, the relevant criterion is nature of work and not volume of work done. Functions may be the same, but responsibility makes the difference. Persons were holding similar posts and doing similar work, difference being only in degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, it was held that it affords valid ground to give them different pay scales. Further, the Officers in junior management grade of the Bank had challenged the benefit of higher starting pay given to Probationary Officer, Trainee Officer and Rural Development Officer (Generalist Officers), but denied to Specialist Officers such as Asstt. Law Officer, Security Officer, Asstt. Engineer etc. Such denial of higher start to Specialist officers was held to be justified on the ground that the Specialist Officers were not exposed to operational risk and do not take vital decisions as taken by Generalist Officers. When it comes to question of pay scales and pay benefits, the recommendations of Pay Commission, pay structure adopted by Government pursuant to such recommendation, questions regarding equivalence of posts, nature of duties and responsibilities attached to the post are the relevant considerations. (See State of Bihar Vs. S.P.M. Staff Union : AIR 2002 SC 2145). Advocates working as part-time lecturers on purely contractual basis, have no legal right to obtain writ of or in nature of mandamus directing authorities to grant minimum scale of pay of Assistant Professors. They being no in regular employment, principles of service jurisprudence cannot be extended to an advocate who is acting as part time lecturer (A.P. Angsumohan vs. State of Tripura : AIR 2004 SC 267).
Cont....
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